2000. 07.--2000. 09 26. The three aspects (20) 07/10/2000 On relationism, again In my preceding post relationism came onstage again, and would still do as an important topic hereafter, so I would like to explain it a bit more. (*1) The concept 'relationism' was actively used by Hiromatsu to characterize Marx's new viewpoint, which opposes to 'reification' or
Verdinglichung. He explicated that concept: Hiromatsu mentioned Buddhism as a classical example that keeps away from reification and sticks to relationism.
Buddhism preaches that beings are nothing and that nothing is beings. It denies the substantial soul
completely, not only after but also before one's
death. What about relationship itself then? How did
Hiromatsu define
it? It may be childish to criticize him simply for his comment on the impossibility of defining relationship, even if we do not accept that transcendent easily as a self-evident concept, nor as a legitimate posit like an undefined term in mathematics. ------------------------------------------------- (*1) Relationism and the ' priority of relations to things' are practically the same thing, albeit used in different contexts. As for the latter, see The three aspects (3) dated 10/27/1999. (*2) The Composition of the Reification Theory, Iwanami Shoten, 1983, chap. 2, sec. 1; see also op. cit., chap. 1, sec. 2. (*3) The Forefront of Contemporary
Philosophy, pp. 86-7. 27. The three aspects (21) 09/25/2000 The third aspect: the creation of meta-worlds (7) ----------------------------- 1770 Hegel was born in Stuttgart. 1801
Hegel arrived in Jena. 1831
Hegel died of cholera. -------------------------------
As
we see it, in his first important essay, The
Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy,
Hegel only showed us the basic cause of the Hegelian contradiction, but
not its detailed mechanism. (*1)
For our cognition the totality is the first and determines its parts (*2), as
Jacobi (1743-1819) said (*3).
The infinite is absolute affirmation, and the finite or the determined is
negation (*4),--according to Spinoza's definition of Substance (*5). The absolute is the absolute identity of the contraposed or the
finite,--the idea chanted by Hegel alongside of Schelling (1775-1854). Those three points were not original to Hegel, but preconditions for his philosophy. ------------------------------------------------- (*2) " . . . für diese [die Erkenntnis] müssen die Teile schlechthin durchs Ganze bestimmt, das Ganze das Erste der Erkenntnis sein." (Glauben und Wissen, Suhrkamp Verlag, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 2, S. 402) (*3) "Jacobi erkennt im Satze des Grundes seine Bedeutung als Prinzips der vernünftigen Erkenntnis, totum parte prius esse neccesse est [a literal translation: 'It is necessary that the total is prior to its part.'--Taki] . . .; oder das Einzelne ist nur im Ganzen bestimmt;" (ebenda, S. 335) (*4) " . . . der absolute Begriffe (ist) Unendlichkeit--an sich absolute Affirmation . . . " (ebenda, S. 351) (*5) "Das Unendliche definiert Spinoza
(Ethik, p. I, Pr. VIII, Sch. I) als die absolute Affirmation der Existenz irgendeiner
Natur, das Endliche im Gegenteil als eine teilweise Verneinung."
(ebenda, S. 345) (*8)
" . . . die
Gegensätze, die sich
vorfinden, . . . als Geist und Welt, als Seele und Leib, als Ich und Natur
usw." (Glauben und Wissen,
Suhrkamp Verlag, Werke in zwanzig
Bänden,
Bd. 2, S. 302)
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