2000. 04.--2000. 06. 21. The three aspects (15) 04/10/2000 The third aspect: the creation of meta-worlds (2) Before we investigate the origin and the mechanism of the Hegelian contradiction and its following movement, it would be better to see the result of them; as when it is hard to reason out the culprit in a detective story, we had better think who got a profit from the murder. In The Phenomenology of
Spirit, for example, 'consciousness' passes through several stages: sense-certainty--this, perception--thing, understanding--force, etc. Each stage, which is a
being-form of spiritual substance, possesses wholeness in its sphere and makes its own
world. Those worlds have generated from the preceding as the products of its contradiction and
the following movement. Then how should we, new millennium philosophical students, call the process without incurring
a harsh criticism even from logical positivists? Metalanguage is a language used to describe or analyze another language
(an object language). The latter may be a natural language
(e.g., English, German, etc. in daily use) or a formal, artificial language. Now, the example of explaining English (an object language) grammar in English (a metalanguage) attracts our attention. Where did this metalanguage come from? Naturally, from our ordinary English, the object language. We got the metalanguage as if it had copied from the object one at the very moment we took the latter as
our research
object. The characteristics
above of metalanguage are, we think, common to the Hegelian process of successive stages.
So we call those stages 'meta-worlds.' The Hegelian contradiction and its dialectical movement may
be about the logic of the metaworld or 'meta-movement.' ------------------------------------------------- (*1) " . . . die sinnliche Welt als selbst reelle Wirklichkeit." (Phänomenologie des Geistes, Suhrkamp Verlag, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 3, S. 119)
The third aspect: the creation of meta-worlds (3) In his first published writing,
The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of
Philosophy (1801), Hegel
wrote: 'The I = the I' is not the same
formula as formal logic uses,
i.e., 'A = A,' which is merely the law of identity, let alone a meaningless tautology.
Fichte's formula shows that the former I as the subject posits itself as the object, that is, 'positing itself' (Sich-selbst-Setzen).
(*4) Roughly speaking, with 'the I = the I' he first had his own philosophical formula: the world posits itself into doubleness, still holding identity. (Which we call the metaworld.) He continued to use the formula, 'the I = the I,' in his main works. (*7) It may not a too farfetched way for us to get the idea of 'meta-' from metalanguage, for we find the following sentences in his later work
(1807): ------------------------------------------------- (*1) "Die
Kantische Philosophie hatte es bedurft, daß ihr Geist vom
Buchstaben geschieden und das rein spekulative Prinzip aus dem Übrigen
herausgehoben wurde, . . . " (Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems
der Philosophie, Suhrkamp
Verlag, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 2,
S. 9)
The third aspect: the creation of meta-worlds (4) We inferred
that the Hegelian contradiction has its roots in the 'meta-structure' of the
world (*1), and reported that the young Hegel recognized that structure in Fichte's 'the I = the I' as the identity of the subject and the
object. (*2) But is there anything worth at all bringing forward a new coinage, the 'metaworld'? Apart from Hegelianism and metalanguage, what is it? And could it have any impact on the contemporary intellectual
scene? People ordinarily live in their everyday world. It is sensuous: it is full of colors, sounds, feels and so on. It also gives us various emotions and values:
A 85 mm Planar f/1.4 lens before me has an mysterious air. Happily, every sphere above
lives up to its self-important name,
'world': While autonomous,
those worlds are not unrelated to, but produced from each other. It is
said that the scientific world is the result of abstraction and the exactness of the everyday
world; the latter is, reversely, the effect of the physical and chemical reaction in our brain
of the former world.
Even the existence of god can be proved by human reason, or he is simply a product of our
imagination; to men of religion a human being is just a creature of God,
etc. ------------------------------------------------- (*1) cf. The three aspects (15) dated 04/10/2000. (*2) cf. The three aspects (16) dated 04/20/2000. (*3) " . . . das Bewußtsein . . . , das die rein formale Erscheinung des Absoluten der Widerspruch ist,--ein Bewußtsein, das nur entstehen kann, wenn die Spekulation von der Vernunft und dem A = A als absoluter Identität des Subjekts und Objekts ausgeht." (Differenz, Suhrkamp, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 2, S. 41) (*4) To make the matter simple, we suppose the classic natural science before Planck and Einstein. (*5) My essay, The Genesis and Structure of Worlds, argues on the metaworld thematically. Especially, ' 1.
The Layering and contracting of worlds.'
The third aspect: the creation of meta-worlds (5) Some people would say, "Certainly we have a lot of worldviews today. But it is not because there are indeed a lot of worlds, but just because of so many viewpoints. We change a point of view according to a situation and depict the same thing differently." However, when we inquire the logical status of
that "same thing differently" depicted, can we see any difference
between that 'same thing' and Kantian thing in itself? We cannot accept such
'same
thing.' Further it should be pointed out against
such 'same-thing-theory' (*1) that so-called different depictions cannot overlap each other precisely or
essentially. As for the young Hegel, he was thinking of works of art, religion and speculation as the cases of positing-oneself, i.e., the metaworld in our wording. (*2) Labor as Man's or society's objectification of itself had not yet occurred to his mind at the point of The Difference (1801). ------------------------------------------------- (*1) That theory has typically been presented as the thesis of the ' one-over-another depiction on the same thing' by Shozo Omori, a Japanese analytic (ordinary language school) philosopher. (*2) z.B. "Die Kunst, drückt sich Fichte aus, macht den transzendentalen
Gesichtspunkt zu dem gemeinen, indem auf jenem die Welt gemacht, auf diesem
gegeben ist: auf dem ästhetischen ist sie gegeben, wie sie gemacht
ist. Durch das ästhetische Vermögen ist eine wahre Vereinigung
des Produzierens der Intelligenz und des ihr als gegeben erscheinenden
Produkts,--des sich als unbeschränkt und zugleich als Beschränktheit
setzenden Ich anerkannt, oder vielmehr eine Vereinigung der Intelligenz
und der Natur, . . . " ( Suhrkamp, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 2, S.
91)
The third aspect: the creation of meta-worlds (6) Now, after a good rest, our next task is to elucidate the mechanism of
the Hegelian contradiction. It is, however, very
heavy, of course. I too wish to write: "I have discovered a truly remarkable proof, but the hard drive space of the server computer is too small to
reserve it." To return to our subject: what did Hegel think about the cause of contradiction in The Difference (1801), which was the start point of Hegelianism? He insists there:
We can easily observe in No. i that Hegel only adduced an abstract, though fundamental, reason for the cause of contradiction at the starting point of his philosophy: the limitless Absolute should be limited to be recognized. But in The
Difference he had already got a precondition for
the Hegelian contradiction, that is, the relational worldview. Because the limited beings in
No. ii are all the being-forms of the Absolute, each limited being is a
whole in its own way. (*3) Still, that whole is merely part of the Absolute
( the real totality) in regard to the latter. (*4) Hegel's relationism
was a thoroughgoing one. Substantialism, which presupposes things that are grounded on themselves, was completely denied: ------------------------------------------------- (*1) "Das Absolute soll fürs Bewußtsein konstruiert werden, [das] ist die Aufgabe der Philosophie; da aber das Produzieren sowie die Produkte der Reflexion nur Beschränkungen sind, so ist dies ein Widerspruch. Das Absolute soll reflektiert, gesetzt werden; damit ist es aber nicht gesetzt, sondern aufgehoben worden, denn indem es gesetzt wurde, wurde es beschränkt." (Differenz, Suhrkamp Verlag, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 2, S. 25) (*2) "Die Vermittlung dieses Widerspruch ist die philosophische Reflexion. . . . die Reflexion hat als Vernunft Beziehung auf das Absolute, und sie ist nur Vernunft durch diese Beziehung; die Reflexion vernichtet insofern sich selbst und alles Sein und Beschränkte, indem sie es aufs Absolute bezieht. Zugleich aber eben durch seine Beziehung auf das Absolute hat das Beschränkte ein Bestehen." (ebenda, S. 25 f.) (*3) z.B. "In dieser Organisation [ von Erkenntnissen--Taki] ist jeder Teil zugleich das Ganze, denn er besteht als Beziehung auf das Absolute." (ebenda, S. 30) (*4) z.B. "das Absolute, weil es im Philosophieren von der Reflexion fürs Bewußtsein produziert wird, wird hierdurch eine objektive Totalität, ein Ganzes von Wissen, eine Organisation von Erkenntnissen." (ebenda, S. 30) (*5) Cf. The three aspects (6) dated 12/03/1999. (*6) " . . . durch diese Beziehung vergeht aber ihr Werk, und nur die Beziehung besteht und ist die einzige Realität der Erkenntnis." (ebenda, S. 30) (*7) " . . . in jenem [Realismus] das Subjekt als Produkt des Objekts, in diesem [Idealismus] das Objekt als Produkt des Subjekts gesetzt wird; . . . das Produkt keinen Bestand hat als nur im Produzieren, nicht gesetzt ist als ein Selbständiges, vor und unabhängig von dem Produzieren Bestehendes." (ebenda, S. 49)
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