04/2001--06/2001 33. The Three aspects (24) 06/24/2001 The
third aspect: the creation of meta-worlds (10) Preface and Introduction of The Phenomenology of Spirit
Even though Hegel did not mention his important idea,
"contradiction," in the preface and introduction of The
Phenomenology of Spirit, it
is obvious that in this book each "station" is generated from
the contradiction of the moments the former one has. However, since the
ontological reason of contradiction in general was not explained by him
there, we had better turn our eyes to another point at issue: many people
have criticized Hegel for his identification of being with the concept or
thought. How should we approach this problem?
Indeed Hegel wrote:
Hegel is, of course, a typical spiritualist who holds reality, the entity
of the universe, spiritual or ideal. But this does not mean he took no
notice of the material moment of things. As we observed on his monism of
consciousness (*3), he oriented himself toward the mutual relation between
an object (i.e., being) and the I (concept in the ordinary sense); these
two pure poles are merely the products of our abstraction and do not exist
actually. So his treatment of the being-concept problem must have unique
character. ------------------------------------ (*1) "Das Dasein ist Qualität, sichselbstgleiche Bestimmtheit
oder bestimmte Einfachheit, bestimmter Gedanke; . . . Dadurch ist es nous, als für welchen Anaxagoras
zuerst das Wesen erkannte. Die nach ihm begriffen bestimmter die Natur des
Daseins als eidos
oder idea d. h. bestimmte Allgemeinheit, Art." (Phänomenologie
des Geistes,
Suhrkamp
Verlag, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 3, S. 54) (*2)
"In dieser Natur dessen, was ist, in seinem Sein sein Begriff zu sein
. . . " (ebenda, S. 54 f.) (*3)
See 4. The three aspects (1) 10/14/1999. 34. The Three aspects (25) 06/28/2001 The
third aspect: the creation of meta-worlds (11)
System
of Philosophy in Manuscripts in
In Hegelian system matter is the self-identity of Spirit. Hegel wrote in
1804/5:
Some people, based on the sentences above and the like, argue about the
materialistic stage of the young Hegel's philosophical development. However,
his "ether" or "absolute matter" is only one moment of
Spirit. (*3) And they sound to us like metaphors rather than philosophical
terms, though they are in fact the latter in his natural philosophy. Hegel
was from first to last an idealist.
If we accept Hegel's ontological explanation about matter as cited above, a
naïve question still arises. The so called ether does not exist really
or ontically; then, what about real existence or being in ordinary sense?
Let us follow his text:
Instead of Spirit never being in existence, (*5) its moments with own
definitions have existence. In our wording, the world itself (Spirit a la
Hegel) never subsist, but worlds (its moments) in the process of
meta-movement come into existence. ----------------------------------- (*1)
"Dieses in seiner Unendlichkeit absolut in sich reflektierte, das sich
Selbstgleiche, das alle Momente derselben in sich selbst vertilgt hat, ist
der ruhige bestimmungslose seelige Geist; als diese reine unbewegte Ruhe,
das aus oder vielmehr in der Bewegung in sich Zurückgekehrte, der
absolute Grund und Wesen aller Dinge, ist der Äther,
oder die absolute Materie, das
absolute Elastische . . . jede Form sich gebende und Ausdrückende."
(Jenaer Systementwürfe II,
Felix Meiner Verlag, S. 200) (*2)
"Der Äther durchdringt nicht alles, sondern er ist selbst Alles;"
(ebenda, S. 202) (*3)
S. "The active God as the self-identical absolute circle, which is the
totality of the self-reflection-into-itself, have self-identity as his
moment. [Having] this self-identity as his moment, God is the self-identical
Spirit, which does not recognize itself as the absolute Spirit. He is Nature
and this self-identity of Spirit or of the other of the active God is the
absolute matter, . . . " (*4) "Der Äther aber ist absoluter Geist,
der sich auf sich selbst bezieht, sich nicht als absoluten Geist erkennt.
Diese Bestimmtheit aber affiziert seine geistige absolute Natur nicht, nur
daß er . . . seinen Momenten den Schein des Fürsichseins aufdrückt;
aber auch ihre Erscheinung, oder die Realität desselben, als Existenz,
. . . " (ebenda, S. 201) (*5)
" . . . daß ihre Unendlichkeit [die Unendlichkeit der Momente],
als negative Einheit [d.h. der Geist--Taki], in welcher sie schlechthin
aufgehoben sind, . . . bleibt, und nicht in die Existenz tritt." (ebenda, S. 202) Comments and suggestions are always welcomed. e-mail : takin@be.to
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