07/2000--09/2000 26. The three aspects (20) 07/10/2000 On relationism, again In my preceding post relationism came onstage again, and would still do as an important topic hereafter, so I would like to explain it a bit more. (*1) The concept 'relationism' was actively used by Hiromatsu to characterize
Marx's new viewpoint, which opposes to 'reification' or Verdinglichung. He explicated that concept: Hiromatsu mentioned Buddhism as a classical example that keeps away from reification and sticks to
relationism.
Buddhism preaches that beings are nothing and that nothing is beings. It denies the substantial soul
completely, not only after but also before one's
death. What about relationship itself then? How did
Hiromatsu define
it? It may be childish to criticize him simply for his comment on the impossibility of defining relationship, even if we do not accept that transcendent easily as a self-evident concept, nor as a legitimate posit like an undefined term in mathematics. ------------------------------------------------- (*1) Relationism and the 'priority of relations to things' are practically the same thing, albeit used in different contexts. As for the latter, see The three aspects (3) dated 10/27/1999. (*2) The Composition of the Reification Theory, Iwanami Shoten, 1983, chap. 2, sec. 1; see also op. cit., chap. 1, sec. 2. (*3) The Forefront of Contemporary
Philosophy, pp. 86-7. 27. The three aspects (21) 09/25/2000 The third aspect: the creation of meta-worlds (7) ----------------------------- 1770 Hegel was born in Stuttgart. 1801
Hegel arrived in Jena. 1831
Hegel died of cholera. -------------------------------
As
we see it, in his first important essay, The
Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy,
Hegel only showed us the basic cause of the Hegelian contradiction, but
not its detailed mechanism. (*1)
Those three points were not original to Hegel, but preconditions for his philosophy. ------------------------------------------------- (*1) cf. The three aspects (19) dated 06/28/2000.(*2) " . . . für diese [die Erkenntnis] müssen die Teile schlechthin durchs Ganze bestimmt, das Ganze das Erste der Erkenntnis sein." (Glauben und Wissen, Suhrkamp Verlag, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 2, S. 402) (*3) "Jacobi erkennt im Satze des Grundes seine Bedeutung als Prinzips der vernünftigen Erkenntnis, totum parte prius esse neccesse est [a literal translation: 'It is necessary that the total is prior to its part.'--Taki] . . .; oder das Einzelne ist nur im Ganzen bestimmt;" (ebenda, S. 335) (*4) " . . . der absolute Begriffe (ist) Unendlichkeit--an sich absolute Affirmation . . . " (ebenda, S. 351) (*5) "Das Unendliche definiert Spinoza
(Ethik, p. I, Pr. VIII, Sch. I) als die absolute Affirmation der Existenz irgendeiner
Natur, das Endliche im Gegenteil als eine teilweise Verneinung." (ebenda, S. 345) (*8) " . . . die Gegensätze, die sich vorfinden, . . . als Geist und Welt, als Seele und Leib, als Ich und Natur usw." (Glauben und Wissen, Suhrkamp Verlag, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 2, S. 302) Comments and suggestions are always welcomed. e-mail : takin@be.to
|