first discovered the defect of induction
is well known, the method of natural science, induction, has a fundamental
defect that is the kind of "the fallacy of begging the question":
(Sorry for a rather long explanation.)
Some scientist, for instance, wanted to know the essence of mammal, and he
observed a dog, a mouse and a horse. Then he induced a few common and apparently
important features of the three animals. He supposed that the essence of mammal
was composed of those features.
But why did he not observe a tortoise? He would answer, "Because it
is not a mammal." But how did he know that it is not a mammal? As the very
fact of his research into what mammal is just shows, he did not know that
scientifically. The scientist chose the creatures to observe with his
Further even if he could have concluded from his observation of the three
animals that mammal was a creature which has such and such features, why did he
not count, for example, 'terrestrial' of those features? He would say,"
Because this feature is unessential to mammal." However, again, we have to
ask how he could know that 'terrestrial' is unessential to mammal, whose
essential features he did not know at the time when he induced common features.
Of course, that scientist can practically improve his inductive knowledge with
much more observations, using hypotheses ingeniously and proceeding step by
step, but whatever he does, his thought should always be within the logic of
"the fallacy of begging the question."
Now, my question is who first pointed out that defect of induction. Does this
credit go to F. W. J. Schelling (yes, famous German idealist)? Or somebody else?
Thanks in advance.
(Pardon me again for my powerlessness to translate the German text into
Die gewöhnliche Erklärung des Ursprungs der Begriffe, . . . diejenige
nämlich, nach welcher mir dadurch, daß ich von mehreren einzelnen
Anschauungen das Bestimmte vertilge, und nur das Allgemeine behalte, der
Begriff entstehen soll, läßt sich sehr leicht in ihrer Oberflächlichkeit
darstellen. Denn um jene Operation vorzunehmen, muß ich ohne Zweifel
jene Anschauungen mit einander vergleichen; aber wie komme ich dazu, ohne
schon von einem Begriff geleitet zu sein? Denn woher wissen wir denn, daß
jene einzelnen uns gegebenen Objekte derselben Art sind, wenn nicht das
erste uns schon zum Begriff geworden ist? Also setzt jenes empirische Verfahren,
von mehreren einzelnen das Gemeinschaftliche aufzufassen, schon die Regel
es aufzufassen, d.h. den Begriff, und also ein Höheres als jenes empirische
Abstraktionsvermögen, selbst schon voraus. (System des transzendentalen
Idealismus, Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000, S. 181-182)
Relativism of being before Fichte 07/08/2003
As a novice at Fichte's philosophy, I have been trying to understand it. And an
idea just came to me: relativism of being is one of the most important
characters of German idealism as a whole, from Fichte to Hegel, not only that of
Fichte, for example, wrote:
A given must be something (etwas), however it is so only when there is another
one that is also something, but another. (Grundriß des Eigentümlichen
der Wissenschaftslehre (1795), Felix Meiner Verlag, 1975, S. 5)
(1) I wonder whether such kind of relativism of being or existence (not merely
that of properties: e.g., 'small' has a meaning as long as there is 'big.') is
original to Fichte. If not, from whom did he get that concept.
Then, secondly, when you basically take givens for something, you don't regard
them as naked data, but data inherently pregnant with meaning (e.g., as a desk,
as a few assembled boards, or as brown colored rectangles, etc.).
Consequently phenomena are to be found having ontological 'as-structure,' a la
Heidegger (s. Being and Time, Paragraph 32).
Fichte probably has a similar argument about that 'as (als)' in his book—I
remember vaguely, for it was more than ten years ago when I was forced to read
one of his (maybe) books and impressed by an argument over 'as.'
(2) Unfortunately I can't find out the very book yet in which he expressed his
view on 'as.'
Any suggestions about (1) and (2) above would be appreciated very much.
Re: Relativism of being before Fichte 07/10/2003
indeed for your comments, Herr H. I will think them over.
There are, though, some points in your post on which I couldn't entirely agree
with you now. I am sorry but I'm not familiar with Kant, so my view would be
biased against him and have a tint of Hegelei.
From my viewpoint, the following Fichte's remark is also to be understood
ontologically, i.e. how things exist; while, referring to Kant, you seem to take
it merely epistemologically: how we can recognize things.
"A given must be something (etwas), however it is so only when there is
another one that is also something, but another."
Generally speaking, there could be no ontology for Kant, because 'Ding an sich'
is just unintelligible. Then leaves only his epistemology, in which phenomenal
"diversity is presupposed," as Fichte criticized in the very same
paragraph where the cited sentences above are put. There Fichte opposes
himself to Kantian epistemology, which proceeds from concrete diversity to the
universal; he wants to go "from undetermined and undeterminable infinity to
(Consequently, even if we want to "compare several things in order to
abstract their common characteristics and subtract their differences", such
a traditional cognitive procedure in with a passive manner would be useless,
since there is only "undetermined and undeterminable infinity" at
first---when we accept Fichte's standpoint.)
First of all, he thinks, the fact itself that diversity is given in our
experience should be proved. He tries to fulfill this task with his metaphysics
that all the finite is a product of the determining activity of the I.
So I supposed, maybe rather arbitrarily with layman's license, in my last post
that the ontological problem of how things exist must have emerged in that cited
By the way, the paragraph in question is as follows:
Hierüber noch einige Worte zur Erläuterung, Kant geht aus von der
Voraussetzung, daß ein Mannigfaltiges für die mögliche Aufnahme
zur Einheit des Bewußtseins gegeben sei, und er konnte, von dem Punkte aus,
auf welchen er sich gestellt hatte, von keiner andern ausgehen. Er begründete
dadurch das Besondere für die theoretische Wissenschaftslehre; er wollte
nichts weiter begründen, und ging daher mit Recht von dem Besondern zum
fort. Auf diesem Wege nun läßt sich zwar ein kollektives Allgemeines,
ein Ganzes der bisherigen Erfahrung, als Einheit unter den gleichen Gesetzen,
erklären: nie aber ein unendliches Allgemeines, ein Fortgang der Erfahrung
in die Unendlichkeit. Von dem Endlichen aus gibt es keinen Weg in die
Unendlichkeit; wohl aber gibt es umgekehrt einen von der unbestimmten, und
unbestimmbaren Unendlichkeit, durch das Vermögen des Bestimmens zur
Endlichkeit, (und darum ist alles Endliche Produkt des Bestimmenden.) Die
Wissenschaftslehre, die das ganze System des menschlichen Geistes umfassen soll,
muß diesen Weg nehmen, und vom Allgemeinen zum Besondern herabsteigen. Daß
für eine mögliche Erfahrung ein Mannigfaltiges gegeben sei, muß
erwiesen werden; und der Beweis wird folgendermaßen geführt werden:
das Gegebene muß etwas sein, es ist aber nur insofern etwas, inwiefern es
noch ein anderes gibt, das auch etwas, aber etwas anderes ist; und von dem
Punkte an, wo dieser Beweis möglich sein wird, werden wir in den Bezirk des
(Grundriß des Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre (1795), Felix
Meiner Verlag, 1975, S. 4-5)
Re: Relativism of being before Fichte
thanks for taking an interest in my post "Relativism of being,"
I suppose I should report finding out the book in which Fichte touches his
notion of "as (als)." It is "Guide to the Blessed Life"
(or "The Way towards the Blessed Life"), The fourth lecture. (Die
Anweisung zum seligen Leben (1806), Felix Meiner Verlag, 1970, S. 63-66)
It is too heavy for me to sum up Fichte's argument here. I would only like
to recommend reading those pages to those who don't throw away German
Idealism for the sake of its "mysticism," but rather want to grasp
it in a framework of our contemporary, current logic.
of the Modern World View 08/12/2003
As is well known, the epistemology of the mainstream modern world view, which
was typically expressed by Descartes, Kant, etc., and has become our common
sense or prejudice, has characteristics below. (mostly quoted from W.
Hiromatsu's _The Intersubjective Ontologic-Structure of the World_. 1972. 7-8.)
It is said that those characteristics were first clearly formulated by
neo-Kantians. Unfortunately I don't know who expounded each point of them. (Nor
my friends; there are so few students of neo-Kantianism these days!)
suggestions would be appreciated.
1) The proposition of personalness (Der Satz der Jemeinigkeit od. Persönlichkeit):
"This phenomenal world around me is, as a whole and after all, the field of
_my_ consciousness; it's _mine_, isn't it?"
Modern subjectivity is ultimately equal to the workings of consciousness, which
is always personal, i.e., belongs to each individual. (Although some schools
propose transcendental, superpersonal epistemological-subjectivity, they still
hold consciousness of an actual individual to be personal.)
Modern epistemology presupposes that such personal consciousness is isomorphic:
as if we were all wearing the identical 'transcendental' glasses to see our
objects. So our perceptions of the same thing must be one and the same in
2) The three-term schema of cognition:
A cognitive act is understood in the three-term schema: an object of cognition
(e.g., a tree itself)--contents of my consciousness (representations or images
of the tree)--a cognitive subject (the workings of my consciousness).
In logical order both an object (a tree itself) and a cognitive subject come
first. Then is produced the middle term (representations of the tree), which is
ontologically separated from, and materially has nothing common to, the
objective tree itself, for the middle term is a product of the cognitive subject
under the influence of the tree itself.
(While the separation of contents of consciousness from an object itself is
abolished by some schools, they presuppose the three-term schema yet.)
Naturally, a cognitive subject can influence on (at least part of) contents of
his/her consciousness, modify or change them.
3) The proposition of immanency (Der Satz der Immanenz od. des Bewußtseins):
Data directly given to a cognitive subject are merely images, representations,
ideas, etc., which are all immanent in consciousness: they are contents of
consciousness. An object itself is indirectly knowable, only through them.
6. Cogito vs. Intersubjectivity
suspicion or objection some list members may have read the words
“prejudice” (“preconception” would have been more adequate.) and
“intersubjective” in my last post, which I felt off-list:
epistemology of the mainstream modern world view . . . has become our common
sense or *prejudice*, has characteristics below. (mostly quoted from W.
Hiromatsu's _The *Intersubjective* Ontologic-Structure of the World_. 1972.
they take as self-evident truth the proposition of personalness among the
characteristics of the modern world view:
The proposition of personalness:
"This phenomenal world around me is, as a whole and after all, the
field of _my_ consciousness; it's _mine_, isn't it?"<<
That proposition has bolstered up the Cartesian cogito (“I think”). So,
if we were not able to controvert such personalization of the phenomenal
world or our consciousness, what remains to us would be "only to do the
cancan within the Cartesian horizon." (W. Hiromatsu) And in such a
case, I suppose —may I continue? — we will eventually have to
cry, “Ouch, we can no more swing up our legs higher!”
on the other hand “intersubjectivity,” i.e. “we think,” is yet a
very dubious concept. So it wouldn’t be worthless introducing the argument
about the proposition of personalness by Hiromatsu (ibid., pp. 7-9.):
If I cover my ears with my hands, for instance, the field of my consciousness changes drastically: I can
not hear a cock crowing any more. But this case does not necessarily qualify
us to insist that the sound of crows (a phenomenon or given) is my
case only tells us that the sound I hear is mediated (i.e. conditioned or
influenced) by me or my body in the same way as by the state of things: the
sound source, the (non) existence of a wall, a moist/dry air, etc. So it may
be preferable to say that the sound belongs to the totality of related
physical matters, to ascribe it to me alone.
I hear the sound of a crow as "cocke-cockoh." In Japanese culture
perceiving and pronouncing a crow that way is most natural. Then the sound
belongs to other (Japanese) people and their culture as well.
crow of "cocke-cockoh" in
and “cock-a-doodle-doo” in English speaking countries
is very often cited to illustrate the cultural effect on us, this example
itself has met with many criticisms; it is, at least, oversimplified for a
strict argument. But here it would serve our purpose.)
Generally speaking, phenomena belong to the totality of the world, which
includes me, other people, physical and cultural environments. Originally
the phenomenal world is, Hiromatsu then concludes, pre-personal or
the concept of the personalness of consciousness (i.e. the immanent
belongingness of consciousness to the atomistic subject) has come from the
assumption of the immortal soul or a spiritual entity behind our
consciousness, which was then thought as a property or working of such an
entity. Combined with the belief in the salvation of the soul, the concept
has persisted to this day.
we disregard that religious assumption, however, the only way of supporting
the concept of personal consciousness would be to demonstrate the
particularity of our physiological conditions, especially the personalness
of our brain.
Needless to say, each brain is personal and particular. But does our
consciousness immanently belong to a biological brain?
Conscious phenomena are certainly controlled by physiological
functions in a brain; colors, shapes, etc. of things are, for instance,
correlated with cerebral processes. Yet those electrical, chemical processes
as such are neither colors nor shapes; they are not conscious phenomena, as
the vibration of air as such is not the least a sound.
colors and shapes are not in a three-dimensional, physical brain literally.
Thus the argument for the personalness of consciousness grounded on the
immanent belongingness to a brain is utterly unsuccessful.
I’d like to add my comment:
argument that stands on the sense-certainty, “This world is obviously _my_
conscious phenomena,” is useless, too. However much, for instance, you
shout with glaring eyes, clutching a wallet, "This is _my_ money! I'm
certain of it," your money is, in fact, part of currency in general
use. And due to its generality, it can be accepted by other people. Your
'ownership' of the money means that you can use it at will under the
protection of the law, more precisely, that you are set in social relations
to other people and products in a certain economic system. Anyway, the
difference between your money and others’ is merely that of the quantity
and variety of currencies.
As for _my_ consciousness, the story is much the same. The basic
difference in the consciousness of each person results from the
particularity of his/her position and perspective in the pre-personal
world, not from the personalness of consciousness or a soul.
think Mr. Hoorn grasped a good point when he wrote:
<And patches of colour is not what you see, you see people, trees,
and, referring to Russell,
<we know tables through sense-data of brown rectangular objects, but it is
the table that we so come to know and not the sense-data>
(Though, from my view-point, that comment is not 'realistic,' but shows the
idealistic moment of phenomena-as explained later.)
To avoid futile confusion, we should first confirm the meaning of concepts. As
is well known, the history of philosophy tells us as follows:
Traditionally 'realism' is opposed to idealism ('Materialism vs. idealism'
scheme of Feuerbach and Marx is another story now.) The reason for the severe
feud between those two isms in the modern period is that the 'subject-object'
schema, which is supported by Cartesian 'mind-matter' dualism, has become the
framework of our world-view. Those two substances are just incommensurable. When
the viewpoint of the world should be integrated comprehensively, sometimes the
former was denied, that is realism; and sometimes the latter was lost, then
Because it is naturally impossible to reduce one side to the other completely,
there remains the everlasting change of subjectivism (or idealism) and
objectivism (or realism) into each other--an impasse.
Then various new trends of thought that tried to remove the presupposition of
the very 'subject-object' schema have emerged. One of them was phenomenalism
(the question at issue), which could include E. Mach, H. Bergson, K. Nishida, B.
Russell, and so on. Most of them started from a phenomenal world that might be
earlier than the differentiation of the
subject and the object, took the world as it is or as it appears, so to speak,
before an innocent child. And they got 'world elements' or 'sensation ' (Mach),
'sense data' (Russell), etc.
So we could be allowed to say that phenomenalism is neither a sort of idealism
nor realism in that basic, first stage. Secondarily, whether phenomena are ideal
or real, mental or material, some subjective and others objective, each having
both ideal and real moments, or ever neutral is a problem that is to be in
charge of each phenomenalist.
To be followed, maybe.
Phenomenalism (2) 11/04/2003
not being a phenomenalist, we would occasionally be under the necessity of
adopting phenomenal ways. So it might not be a waste of time to check the
limitations of phenomenalism.
According to typical phenomenalists, when Mr. A sees an apple on a table,
for instance, what really exist are certain phenomena, for example. a patch
of red color, a round shape, etc; the apple, which we deem to be a solid
substance, is but a compound of phenomenal elements. In logical order of
cognition the apple is the secondary thing constructed afterwards by A.
However, isn't an 'apple' in fact more than the name of the compound of
elements? In other words, does the phenomenal world consist merely of
'realistic' phenomenal elements? ---So W. Hiromatsu (1933-1994) asks,
criticizing E. Mach. Of course, he does not want to insist that, in addition
to the hyle of phenomenal elements, there is also something like the
stoicheion of substantial eidos in the world.
But there must be gaps between the phenomenal world as such and the total of
realistic phenomenal elements. So typical phenomenalists (e.g. Mach) have to
fill up the gaps with the concept of 'compound' (of phenomenal elements), or
'construction.' This sort of 'compound' itself is surely not a realistic,
sensuous phenomenon. Then, what kind of ontological character does the
'compound,' i.e. the constructed thing, have?
While phenomenal elements are changeable, in a state of flux with conditions
of light, our viewpoint, etc., the 'compound' (the apple as such) remains as
the same one; your friend Paul may look different everyday, though he is
still the same Paul each time when you see him. So those compounds have an
irreal and ideal character (that is, the character of meaning). And to tell
the phenomenal truth, you first encounter a meaning ("That's
Paul!") of a phenomenon and then, if paying more attention, its
phenomenal elements: unkempt hair, unshaved face, etc. In case of taking
closer notice, first "Unkempt hair!", then the protruded black
lines in all directions.
Properly speaking, every phenomenon appears _as_ something more (e.g. an
ideal apple) than a sensuous given or merely sensitive, naked data (a patch
of red color). A phenomenon has the 'as-structure' a la Heidegger, i.e. both
an ideal moment and a real moment.
Hiromatsu tells that the 'something more' is not a representation
associating with a sensuous given in our mind. For example:
(1) When you see an eraser on a desk, you do not have its representation
somewhere in your mind. (You only see its visual image on the desk.)
(2) Seeing your old friend for the first time in ten years and recognizing
him as X, you would probably remember his old countenance--yet this image or
representation of him is not X (the 'something more'). _Both_ his present
countenance before you and his old image in your mind appears as X.
'Something more' is neither physical nor psychic realia. If we consider it
separately and by itself, it assumes a character of 'ideal' a la Plato.
The as-structure is seen even in our most basic perceptions: when you look
at something on your desk that should be a plane and rectangular figure in
your physiological visual field, it appears intuitively, however, as an
eraser that has a three-dimensional body. And in our daily life the
importance of phenomena lies in their meaningful moment, the 'something
Now, the question is how that ideal moment was formed, which, needless to
say, does not exist transcendently in a sort of the intelligible world, nor
is an object of some special 'essence-intuition.' To answer the question, we
should turn our eyes on the subjective side, i.e. a perceiver to whom a
phenomenon is appearing. We will then come together new concepts: the
four-limbs-structure, intersubjectivity, cooperation (or conjunct work)
– in a new horizon called, if misleadingly, historical materialism.
(wow, an antique name!)
Intermezzeo: The Blood-group disposition
1971 a bolt of a miraculous idea from the blue struck
: Nomi's theory of blood-group disposition. The theory
1) your character and personality are inherently influenced or regulated by
your ABO blood type, i.e., type A, B, O, and AB.
2) your personal relation with other people is strongly affected by the
"leading-looking after" relationship, a coinage of Masahiko Nomi
(1925-1981), that is naturally formed between two people of certain
The idea has soon gained popularity and prevailed all over
, in spite of the regrettable defiance and rejection by
academics, who have mostly made no sincere examinations into the matter.
1) According to Nomi, among other features, O group:
are strongly purpose-orientated;
are sensitive to a power relationship;
expressly dislike being subordinate to others.
are considerate of other people's feelings;
are fond of peaceful surroundings;
take time to trust a person;
take social order to be important.
dislike being under restrictions on conduct and thinking;
are fond of non-stereotyped conduct and thinking;
don't care much about customs, rules and other people's feelings.
tend to think rationally in any cases;
are good at adjusting human relations;
hope to live in harmony with society and, at the same time, keep some
distance from it.
(These descriptions are quoted with some revisions from the website of Shozo
Owada, ardent supporter of the theory:
2) If an O group person is in company with an A group one, the former has a
tendency to take a "leading" role, and the latter a "looking
after" role. (Likewise, if a B with an O, an AB with a B, an A with an
AB.) And such a specialization of their roles can keep good relations
The relationship "leading-looking after" is not that of leader and
follower, but rather of child and nanny, so to speak. A nanny can easily
understand a child's feelings and emotions, and give comfort to, cheer up,
(Maybe to be followed.)
The Blood-group disposition (2)
It should be our duty, of course, to be cautious about pseudoscientific
ideas. Then we ought to ask whether the blood-group disposition theory
has scientific or rational grounds.
I) While the blood group was first discovered in our blood, "There is
no doubt that the antigens of the ABO system are widely distributed
throughout the tissues. . . . In the ABO and Lewis systems the blood group
specific substances also occur in tissue fluids and secretions in a
water-soluble form." (1*) By Nomi's account, "Substances that
determine blood groups exist in every corner of our body;" "The
blood group is one of our physical constitutions."
(By the way, it is said about diseases, "Cancer of the stomach is more
common in people of group A than in those of groups O and B. Duodenal
ulceration is more common in nonsecretors of ABH substances than in
secretors. For practical purposes, however, these statistical correlations
are unimportant.") (2*)
Further, "What I (Nomi) especially pay attention to are synapses,"
which are gaps between two nerve cells, across which informative impulses
pass by diffusion of a neurotransmitter. "So a synapse is, as it were,
a battery in which an electrolyte solution varies according to one's blood
group. Even if its difference from each other is subtle, the accumulation of
differences must be immense for there are innumerable synapses in our
"If we can think of a human nervous system including our brain as an
electric circuit, our 'character' may be regarded as a circuit
function." (He was a graduate of an electrical engineering department.)
"When materials that consist of a electric circuit vary according to a
blood group, a circuit function or our character naturally differs from each
From our view point, M. Nomi seems to have tried to put in the blood group
disposition between universal humanity, which has the specific identity of
Homo sapiens sapiens, and our character, which is extrinsically or
secondarily formed through one's own efforts, environment, peculiarities of
one's genes, etc. on the basis of the former two factors. I feel his way of
thinking is so far acceptable.
(1*) "Blood Group." Encyclopedia Britannica. 2004.
Encyclopedia Britannica Premium Service.
30 Apr. 2004
1 May 2004
11. Intermezzeo: The Blood-group disposition (3)
II) Among Nomi's methods of attesting the existence of the blood-group disposition, what I like to take up here is his use of inductive statistics.
(Happily, we are at the threshold of an era when we can easily use statistical methods with a PC and statistical software, whose demo version or Microsoft's Excel would sometimes do enough. Though, needless to say, it is still difficult to understand statistics properly, and find out or gather reliable data to feed into: yes, 'Garbage in, garbage out.'
Once upon a time, Philosophy was the queen of sciences. Then the unbelievable story of her downfall: a handmaid of theology, after that, of symbolic logic?! Recently, alas, it is said she is in the service as a traffic controller. I' m not sure whether it is a desirable career for her to engage in statistics. However, a part-time job as a statistician might serve her in better stead.)
(i) We have the annual song festival on New Year' Eve in Japan. The entrant singers are regarded as the most popular and excellent in the year.
According to Nomi, the163 entrants from 1951 to 1975 were consisted of 61 O groups (37 percent), 48 A groups (29), 28 B groups (17) and 26 AB groups (16). The percentages of O, A, B, AB groups to the total Japanese are respectively 31, 38, 22 and 9 percent. So the O and AB group singers of the festival accounted for relatively great parts of the entrants.
M. Nomi, then, used the chi-square test in order to check whether there were any significant, not accidental, differences in the numbers between the percentage of the entrant singers and that of the total Japanese of each blood group; that is, whether blood-groups influenced on their becoming a successful singer.
The result was that the differences were not accidental when the significance level was set at 1 percent. (i.e., if the occurrence by chance of an under-1 percent-probability must be dismissed.) The blood group seems to have something to do with the success as a popular singer.
By the way, our binominal test, for which we used Excel, also shows that the relatively great percentages of the O and AB blood-groups and the relatively small percentage of the A blood-group are significant at the 5 percent significant level. (1*)
(ii) On the other hand, M. Nomi examined the blood group of the 80 popular hosts of TV shows in Japan in 1974, too, whose job was likely to oblige them to restrain themselves and let others take an active part; their job contrasts sharply with that of popular singers, who should have a vocation for displaying his/her individuality fully. The 80 hosts were consisted of 15 O groups (the expected value: 25), 25 A groups (30), 28 B groups (18) and 12 AB groups (7).
The chi-square test tells us the significant differences between the observed value and the expected when the significance level is set at 1 percent.
Our binominal test shows that the relatively small number of O blood-groups
and the relatively great number of B groups are significant at the 1 percent
significant level. (2*)
Now, M. Nomi commented on the results of (i) and (ii):
People of the group O have a tendency to be self-assertive and show their individuality.
Those of the group A have a vocation for cooperative work in a community.
Those of group B may not be clever in self-expression, but take a keen interest in various things. And they can take proper steps to meet the situation.
And AB groups have both proper self-expression and a tendency to be in harmony with others.
Those conclusions coincided with his expectation he had got from his observation of people around him. (Masahiko Nomi (1925-1981), journalist and writer, was a good judge of character indeed.)
(1*) The formula of:
the O-group: 1-BINOMDIST(60,163,0.31,1)=0.047=4.7 percent
the AB-group: 1- BINOMDIST(25,163,0.09,1)=0.003=0.3 percent
the A-group: BINOMDIST(48,163,0.38,1)=0.014=1.4 percent
(2*) The formula of:
the O-group: BINOMDIST(15,80,0.31,1)=0.010=1.0 percent
the B-group: 1- BINOMDIST(27,163,0.09,1)=0.005=0.5 percent