13. The three aspects (7)  01/07/2000

The second aspect: the priority of relations to things (5)

-- Continued from "9. The three aspects (6)" dated 12/03/1999 JST.--

   Heidegger (sorry, not about Hegel now) considered human existence as 'being-there' (Dasein) or being-in-the-world instead of as the subject of the modern world-view.
   He insisted that existents explicitly understood by being-there have the structure of 'something as something': for instance, when we want to write a letter, we see a desk in our room as a desk that is not merely a chunk of wood. Even if we do not say about it actually, "Desk (or this is a desk at which to write, and the like)," it has this 'as-structure.' (*1)

   It is worthy of notice for us that the lack of 'as' in an object does not mean simple, pure perception. Perception without 'as,' which would give us, so to speak, naked data, is not fundamental but derivative from simple, understanding-perception, which already has the 'as-structure.' (*2)

   This structure was intriguingly developed and varied into the 'four limbs-structure' by Hiromatsu.
   For a start he accepted phenomenalism, which is supposed to perceive the world as it is, being fully aware that such a naive standpoint is, strictly speaking, impossible, and that what we can do at best is to try to see phenomena around us with no preoccupations of any philosophical schools. He then pointed out:
   Phenomena always appear as something more than merely sensitive, naked data; the noisy sound you hear now is perceived as an automobile horn; when you look at something out of the window, which appears intuitively as a pine tree; an eraser on your desk, which 'should' be a plane figure in your sight, appears as a three-dimensional body, and so on.

   Not only in sense perception but also in recognition and judgment we can notice the factor or limb of 'as something more'; when you look at an eraser gain after having shut your eyes for a few seconds, you recognize it as the same eraser; with a judgment "A is B" we take A as something more or B.
   Our consciousness has a significant feature of receiving a given (datum) as something more or other, not merely as such. But what is this 'something more' at all?

   Hiromatsu told that it is not an associated representation in our mind; when you see an eraser on a desk, you do not have a representation of the eraser somewhere in your mind other than its visual image on the desk.
   Seeing your old friend for the first time in ten years and recognizing him as your friend X, you would probably remember his former countenance--yet this representation or image of him in your mind is not your friend X, i.e., not the 'something more.' Both his present countenance before you and the representation of his former countenance in your mind exist as your friend X.

   If we consider this 'something more' separately or by itself, it assumes a character of being ideal a la Plato. The 'something more' is neither physical nor psychic realia.  (e.g., it is neither a representation nor an image in our mind).
   A thing out of a window, for instance, is perceived as a tree. But this 'tree' is something objective as which all particular trees, this pine, that oak, etc., exist. While each real tree has particularity and is in a state of flux, the 'tree' has universality and is unchangeable. The 'tree' has the same character as 'goodness, truth and beauty,' geometric figures, etc.--the character with which they transcend time and space.
   Yet the irreal and ideal 'something more' does not exist spatially apart from a given (datum). A real tree itself, as it were, incarnates the ideal 'tree'; when you perceive a figure written with chalk on a blackboard as a geometric triangle, the latter is not in the world of Forms elsewhere, but lodges in the former.

   In many cases real and particular features of the written triangle are not very important; it does not matter whether the figure be white or red, big or small, and its lines be a little curved or not. Further you can sometimes do well with forming a triangle even with your fingers or making sounds, "triangle," instead of the written figure--if they are recognized as a geometric triangle, which is their meaning.
   Phenomena are, generally speaking, always and already mediated with 'something more (other, ideal, and irreal)' and are the unity of two moments (limbs) that stand at the both sides of 'as': e.g., A (a sensitive given as such) and B (something more) of 'A as B.'

   Signs and languages are the phenomena that have been made to clearly show their 'something more' with vital importance. (*3)


(*1) Sein und Zeit, Paragraph 32

(*2) ebenda.

(*3) Hiromatsu, The Intersubjective Ontologic-Structure of the World, 1972, Chapter One. 
   None of his books have perhaps been translated from Japanese into other languages yet.

 14. The three aspects (8)


The second aspect: the priority of relations to things (6)

   If you only points out the ideality of phenomenal objects and its importance, and are satisfied with that, you might be an idealist in the traditional sense, even sometimes 'misled' into believing in the divine Being, or into some kind of mystification. Hiromatsu was a historical materialist, and stepped forward:
   Phenomena or givens, by definition, exist to someone. For example, I saw a dragonfly in our garden with my friend and his daughter. She cried, "Here's a bird on that twig!" Then said my friend, "No, that's a dragonfly--an insect." (Oh là, là,--a dangerous example again. Though I've learned my lesson from a 'whale' . . .)

   In this case, his visual image of the dragonfly was different from mine because he looked at the creature from other angle. Nevertheless both he and I recognized the phenomenon as a dragonfly, for we are adults with common knowledge.
   So when a image of the creature was perceived by me, the phenomenon's 'something more', i.e., dragonflyness 'appertained' to me as an adult person; and while he perceived another image of the dragonfly, its same 'something more' also appertained to him as an adult.
   Both he and I as an adult person or simply 'man' (*1) were the subjective side to which the phenomenon existed or appertained. (*2) The subjective side consequently has the structure of 'somebody as someone'; it is the unity of two moments (limbs).

   Who is then that 'someone'? In the case above he was an adult with common knowledge who had been molded through education, association, etc., namely, a sort of social product, in which the daughter had yet little participated.
   How a society produces 'someone,' or how our consciousness works in a intersubjectified way as a result differs according to the culture, historical stage, etc. of the society. Americans hear a cock crow, "Cock-a-doodle-doo"; Japanese, "Cocke-cockoh." While we use a Honda motorcycle as a handy machine, it would frighten some tribe members as a demono-horse. (Do such people not exist any more even in the farthest corner of the world today?)

   'Someone' is, like 'something more' of the objective side, characterized with its ideality. The adult person above or 'man' was neither my friend nor I. We were only his examples. He is not old, young, tall, short, …that is, not any particular person. Yet he must be every adult who has common knowledge.
   And if you should teach English to children, your personal features, e.g., the color of your hair, a slight provincial accent, etc., matter little, so long as, besides your skill in teaching, you have grown to be an 'ideal-speaker-listener' (Chomsky). Ideal (irreal) 'someone' is generally more important than real 'somebody.' (*3)


(*1) Here this adult person or man is not objectified, that is, it is not 'something more' of an objective phenomenon.  

(*2) We do not in principle accept the 'subject--object schema' of modern philosophy which substantializes both terms, the subject and the object. But since there must be a knowing side (the subjective moment) and a known one (the objective moment) in the epistemology scene, it would be admitted for us to use these words, the subject and the object, as an expedient.

(*3) Hiromatsu, The Intersubjective Ontologic-Structure of the World, 1972, Chapter one. 
   By the way, I did not think that the author's explanation of the ideal moment of 'someone' was fully successful in the book above. So I referred to his Being and Meaning, 1982, Part one, Chapter two, Section three. It seems to me, however, that the logic of his explanation there is still somewhat confused, being influenced by other issues.


15. The three aspects (9)  01/24/2000

The second aspect: the priority of relations to things (7)

   In a word, Hiromatsu's 'four limbs-structure' is that something as something more exists to somebody as someone. (Gegebenes als etwas Mehr gilt einem als jemandem.)
   Each limbs, however, does not exist in advance nor by itself before forming the relation to each other. What we really find is just the fact that we perceive something as something more: not the individually separated limbs. They together form the 'four limbs-structure compound,' and each of them only exists as a moment of the compound, i.e., as a limb of that relational compound. Metaphysical problems of the past have often risen from false substantialization of one or two limbs.

   We should go into detail of that structure a little more (*1), in order to shed light on our former argument:

   >Hegel's concept (Begriff) includes judgment that is in a propositional form: strictly speaking, "a judgment is concept's determination that is posited at a concept." (*2) For an simple example:
   "A fisherman who bought a car yesterday was my uncle."
 (Though this sentence is too simplified and not Hegelian, it is good enough to see a logical structure.)
   'A fisherman' is surely a "smaller syntactical unit," but it is semantically equal to 'who bought a car yesterday,' a proposition. Hegel would say on this point that the former is direct and the latter is mediated.
   So for a Hegelian a smaller syntactical unit and a proposition are changeful into each other.< (*2)

   Now, from a historical point of view we would like to call a real 'something' of a given the material moment and its 'something more' the formal one.
   The material moment is itself a matter-form compound: for example, the material moment, a chunk of wood, of 'a chunk of wood as a desk' is in fact the compound, 'a brown body as a chunk of wood.' Further the brown body is 'a brown squarish figure as a brown body' and so on. We can not suppose the ultimate matter or a purely sensitive, naked given, which would be logically asked for, but is never a phenomenal given.
   Reversely the formal moment of a desk can be regarded as the material moment: 'a desk as a piece of furniture.' The material moment exists only in the interrelationship with the formal one and conversely. The two moments are progressively in stratum.

   The sentence with many strata of meaning in our argument 1), 'A fisherman who bought a car yesterday was my uncle,' bases on the fact that I took some fisherman as a man who bought a car yesterday and that then I took that fisherman as my uncle.
   Conversely the noun phrase, 'my uncle,' is equal to the proposition, 'A fisherman (who) bought a car yesterday.'; and further the 'fisherman' to 'who bought a car yesterday.'

   So we would be able to tell that every noun is a proposition and that a proposition is the partition of the unity of a noun after Hegel, who said, "Every thing is a judgment."  (*3) and that a judgment (Urteil) is really the original partition (Ur-teil, i.e., ursprüngliche Teilung) of a concept. (*4)
   From our viewpoint, the Hegelian development of the concept consists in stratifying the 'as-structure' progressively.


(*1) cf. Hiromatsu, The Intersubjective Ontologic-Structure of the World, Chapter one.

(*2) cf. 12. Re: language, totality, correspondence, dated 12/16/1999.

(*3) "alle Dinge sind ein Urteil." (Enzyklopädie, Abschn. 167)

(*4) "Die etymologische Bedeutung des Urteils in unserer Sprache ist tiefer und drückt die Einheit des Begriffs als das Erste und dessen Unterscheidung als die ursprüngliche Teilung aus, was das Urteil in Wahrheit ist. " (ebenda, 166)

 16. The three aspects (10)  02/01/2000

The second aspect: the priority of relations to things (8)

   A phenomenal object, Hiromatsu's analysis continues (*1), changes its being or, precisely, so-being (Sosein, not there-being, Dasein) totally according to its 'something more,' that is, how we see an object, even if its material aspect stays just as before.
   For example, Rubin's goblet: the drawing of two faces changes into a goblet when we rather look at the center of the drawing: or a lovely little boy for us but a bearer of flu viruses for a doctor.
   Those examples tell us that the determinant factor of a phenomenon is 'something more.' And this ideal factor is previous to an individual empirical-cognition of an phenomenon. Without it phenomenal object is even not accessible to us. 

   This is the reason why empiricism has generally (?) been at a disadvantage against idealism albeit with the practical popularity of the former in the modern period; and why the previously quoted problem occurs:
   >The method of science, induction, has, as is well known, the fallacy of begging the question:
   A male scientist, for instance, wanted to know the essence or the features of mammal, and he observed a dog, a mouse and a horse. Then he induced common features among the three creatures. He supposed that the essence of mammal was composed of those features.
   But why did he not observe a tortoise? He would answer, "Because it is not a mammal." But how did he know that it is not a mammal? He searched into what mammal is, for he did not know it. The scientist chose the creatures to observe with his 'prejudice.'< (*2)

   The seemingly transcendental form of an object, 'something more' is, though, an corresponding product to the process of intersubjectifying our consciousness; the coagulation of object's form synchronizes with our becoming ideal someone, which is a social role in the broad sense (an adult, an ideal- English speaker-listener, etc.). Or rather, both are just the two sides of the coin. (*3)

   We sometimes hear such questions today, "What is 'Being' itself?" "Why are existents accessible to us at all?" The answer would be, I suppose, that when you observe some object, e.g., a rabbit, you have already become a hunter or a fancier of small animals. 'Being' is merely the abbreviation for the cohesion between ideal 'form' and ideal 'someone.'


(*1) cf. The Intersubjective Ontologic-Structure of the World, Chapter one.

(*2) cf. 11. Re: language, totality, correspondence, dated 12/09/1999.

(*3) Hiromatsu, The Intersubjective Ontologic-Structure of the World, Chapter one.

 17. The three aspects (11)  02/14/2000

The pre-personal world (1)

   It is about time to examine our pending problem, intersubjectivity, without which Hegelianism will not stand up. But typical modern world-views tend to take solipsism of some sort. For example:
   "This phenomenal world around me is, as a whole and after all, the field of my consciousness,--it's mine, isn't it? If you too have some world around you, though I don't have any means to confirm it directly, it's yours, neither mine nor ours."

   The argument above, which is technically called 'the proposition of the personalness (*1)' (Satz der Persönlichkeit), is one of our common knowledge. 

   If we were not able to controvert such personalization of the phenomenal world or consciousness with a persuasive argument, what would remain to us would be "only to do the cancan within the Cartesian horizon." (not me, but Hiromatsu); and, for example, Hegel's Science of Logic, which is "the description of God in His eternal essence before the creation of nature and finite spirit," (*2) would be sheer nonsense.

   Some people would say, "It seems, though, crazy to deny the personalness of the phenomenal world, for . . . "

   Yes, when I cover my ears with my hands, for instance, the field of my consciousness, not yours, changes drastically: e.g., I can not hear a cock crowing any more. But this fact, Hiromatsu argues, only tells us that the sound I hear is mediated, (i.e., conditioned, influenced) by me or my body in the same way as by the existence of air.
   The fact above does not qualify us to insist that the sound of a crow (a phenomenon or given) is my personalia that belongs to me inherently. That is,
  1. The physiological process in my body (especially my ear and brain), which is electrical and chemical, is not 'sound' itself, as the vibration of air, as such, never is. 'Sound' is not in my body. (Do not presuppose that a phenomenon, e.g., the sound of a crow, is in my consciousness and that the latter is in my body or brain.)

  2. 'Sound' is also conditioned by the state of air and sound sources. So it is slightly preferable to say that 'sound' belongs to the total of the related physical world, to insist that it does only to me.

  • I hear the sound of a crow as "Cocke-cockoh," which has been shaped among Japanese people and in their culture. 'Sound' belongs to other (Japanese) people and their culture, too.

   Generally speaking, phenomena belong to the totality of the world, which includes myself, other people, physical and cultural environments. The phenomenal world is, Hiromatsu then concludes, pre-personal or non-personal originally. (*3)


(*1) Later on Mr. Mxx kindly informed me in his post dated 02/15/2000 JST.

  >Personalness is . . . certainly not a common (word).<
    >But one could say, "the particularity of the subject," the point being that a specific cognition is, to some degree, a function of the particular knower. Or again, "the cognitive specificity of the subject."<
   (I appreciate such suggestions indeed. As a non-native speaker of English, I am almost blind to the contextual usage and nuances of words. Euphemism and the definite/indefinite article are also difficult for me to deal with.)
   After much consideration, I still continue to use the word 'personalness' as a translation of 'Persönlichkeit.' I would like to use the terms as follows:
   "Modern epistemology presupposes the isomorphism of the subject:
  i)  we are all wearing the same 'transcendental' glasses, metaphysically or physiologically, to see our objects. So if we see the same object, our perceptions too must be identical with each other in principle.
 ii)  Each of the subjects, of course, has its 'particularity' and 'specificity' to some degree as 'a function of the particular knower,' because of his nature, education, etc. But that does not hinder our possible, if not certain, agreement on the cognition of the same object.
   "We do not deny the 'particularity' nor 'specificity' in the context above, but the isomorphism of the subject, which ontologically has nothing to do with history and culture, should be rejected. And we do not accept the immanent belongingness of consciousness to the atomistic subject, which is just 'personalness.'"

(*2) Wissenschaft der Logik, Einleitung, Suhrkamp Verlag, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 5, S. 44)

(*3) cf. The Intersubjective Ontologic-Structure of the World, Chapter one.

18. The three aspects (12)  02/26/2000

The pre-personal world (2)

   Some people often insist their ownership of consciousness simply from their own 'sense-certainty.' But when you shout with glaring eyes, "This is my money! I'm certain of it," your money is, in fact, part of currency in general use. So your money is accepted by others. And your 'ownership' of the money means that you are under the protection of the law, more precisely, that you are set in certain social relations to other people and social products.
   As for consciousness, the story is much the same. And the particularity of each individual consciousness, in the basic level, results from the singularity of the perspective and the position of each person in the world.

   Other people would argue from a formalistic view point: "Every time we perceive something and report it, we can indeed add our judgment, 'I perceive (think),' before it."
   But Kant, as is well known, pointed out: from such 'I' we are not allowed to deduce that "all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, and have personality with them inseparably . . . , and are conscious of their existence as separate from all matter." (*1)

   Still many of us stick to a natural, in a sense, feeling: my consciousness is mine. Some Sartrian would say in a sciential way, "As for object-positioning consciousness (conscience positionnelle du monde), your argument of the pre-personalness of consciousness might be right. But non-positioning self-consciousness (conscience non-positionnelle de soi) is surely personal."
   The philosophy of J. P. Sartre, who was called the last Cartesian,--though we know well from our experience that the last lasts blasted,--yet differs 'decisively' from that of Descartes in respect of 'cogito' or consciousness itself. His philosophy tells us:

   When I look at a table in my room, for instance, I have a consciousness of the table, which is called 'object (i.e., the table) -positioning consciousness.'
   Then being asked about what I am doing, I instantly come to myself and can answer correctly: "I am checking the table," for I have been conscious, if not clearly, of what I have been doing. We are always with this kind of self-consciousness, which inevitably accompanies object-positioning consciousness, and without which our consciousness would be unconscious (!) --- We would merely become automatons.
  That consciousness is called 'non-positioning self-consciousness.' It is, however, not such usual or Cartesian self-consciousness that is reflected by us, i.e., the self-consciousness that has already become our object like the table above. So it is also named 'nonreflexive self-consciousness' (conscience nonrefléxive de soi). (*2)


(*1) "

Alle denkenden Wesen an sich einfache Substanzen sind, als solche also . . . Persönlichkeit unzertrennlich bei sich führen, und sich ihrer von aller Materie abgesonderten Existenz bewußt sind." (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Von den Paralogismen der reinen Vernunft, B 409)

(*2) cf. Being and Nothingness, Introduction, III.

19. The three aspects (13)  03/08/2000

The pre-personal world (3)

   Surely, Sartrian 'nonreflexive self-consciousness' is no longer an old-fashioned functional pure-I that is the successor of the substantial soul, inherited the functional aspect of the latter and still plays an active part in social sciences. But the point is, from our angle, whether there is any need of presupposing outside the phenomenal world the Sartrian subject, which is a monitoring-I of some sort, and is objectively and realistically 'nothing.'
   If the subject of that sort exists outside the phenomenal world, our phenomenalistic monism or the monism of 'consciousness' a la Hegel collapses. If 'nonreflexive self-consciousness,' on the contrary, is in the phenomenal world, then it is also a phenomenal object among others and in the 'four limbs-structure.'

   Let us start with the former example: when asked about what I am doing, I instantly come to myself and have self-awareness that I have been checking the table.
   Even after having that self-awareness, no change appears to have occurred in my phenomenal world, except for the newly added my consciousness of what I have been doing. This new self-consciousness was not there before. And no objects in my phenomenal world seem to have produced it. Where did this self-consciousness come from?
   It came, Sartrians would answer, from nonreflexive self-consciousness (*1); the newly added self-consciousness is the reflected nonreflexive self-consciousness or monitored monitoring-I, which has now become part of the objective, phenomenal world.

   That is where Hiromatsu brings forth a counterargument: but what were the actual facts in this case?" He examines them again (*2):
   After having that self-awareness, if the phenomenal objects around me has not changed at all, my perspective of the world has widened, in reality. Besides the desk, I now see a chair, my friend, and maybe parts of my body; I am conscious of my body centered in this new perspective. (The word 'perspective' includes not merely a field of vision, but those of other senses.) And I even feel that all the phenomenal objects around me exist to, appertain to my 'body' or the bodily I.
   Consequently the state of 'self-awareness' or 'coming to oneself' is rather a consciousness of one's perspective with his 'body' centered in it, not the consciousness of 'myself' nor monitoring-I, which would be outside the phenomenal world.

   What about nonreflexive self-consciousness itself? Hiromatsu admits after Sartre that it is itself not an object, that it does not posit any particular object, and that it covers, so to speak, all the field of one's consciousness. But he refuses to deduce form those facts that nonreflexive self-consciousness is something subjective that exists outside the phenomenal world, or that is a purely functional agent that lacks contents. Nonreflexive self-consciousness is the consciousness of the perspective or configuration of the phenomenal world.

   If the subject should be something to that the world exists or appertain, but that is not in it, and that is phenomenally nothing, then we deny such a thing. And if we talk about the moments of the subject and the object, they only exist as a mutually mediated relation in the phenomenal world, not as the two transcendental terms of the modern (or Sartrian) 'subject--object schema'.


(*1) cf. Being and Nothingness, Introduction, III. 
   In this book Sartre gives us an example of counting cigarettes.--The good old days. Never warned: "NO SMOKING!"

(*2) cf. The Intersubjective Ontologic-Structure of the World, II, 1. 'The Ontologic-Foundations of Intersubjectivity,' sec. 1; and see Being and Meaning, part one, chapter two, sec. 3.

20. The three aspects (14)  03/27/2000

The third aspect: the creation of meta-worlds (i.e., Substance as Subject) (1)

    As Hegel says, relational determinations (Verhältnisbestimmungen), such as 'over and under', 'father and son,' have their being in their opposition to each other: 
   "Over is what under is not. 'Over' is determined only as not being 'under,' and exists only as long as 'under' exists, and vice versa; in a determination its opposite lies. . . . each exists only as another of another." "They all include the opposition in the one," i.e., in the relation between them. (*1)
   We acknowledge Hegel's argument of 'existence for another' to be appropriate not merely for relational determinations but also for every existent, and agree with him on relationism.

   If his thought had had its limits here and been within the scope of relationism, he would not have become so famous nor notorious. His ideas, however, spread beyond:
   "Opposites contain contradiction as long as they, from the same standpoint, relate to each other negatively or cancel each other out, or are indifferent to each other." (*2)
  "All things are in itself contradictory. . . . Contradiction should be taken to be deeper and more essential than identity. . . . Contradiction is at the root of all movement and liveliness." (*3)

   Further, "the principle of all movement, life and activity in the actual world" is the dialectical. (*4)  "In the dialectical moment these finite determinations supersede themselves, and pass into their opposites." (*5)

   The viewpoint of contradiction and dialectic movement, I think, does not necessarily or inevitably follow from that of 'existence for another' or relationism in general. For example, structural linguistics, which is based on relationism or 'the system of difference,' has said nothing about the inherent movement of a meaning into the opposite one or about something like that.

   The concept of contradiction holds the central position of Hegelianism from the first. The young Hegel set forth his twelve theses in the habilitation-process in 1801, the year when he published the essay, The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy, and six years before the publishing of his first main book, The Phenomenology of Spirit.
   The first thesis is: "Contradiction is the rule of truth, noncontradiction is that of false." (*6)
   (By the way, the second one is: "The syllogism is the principle of idealism.) (*7)


(*1) "Oben ist, was nicht unten ist; oben ist bestimmt nur dies, nicht unten zu sein, und ist nur, insofern ein unten ist, und umgekehrt; in der einen Bestimmung liegt ihr Gegenteil. . . . jedes ist nur als dies Andere des Anderen;"
"-- enthalten alle den Gegensatz in Einem." (Wissenschaft der Logik, Suhrkamp Verlag, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 6, S. 77)

(*2) "Die Entgegengesetzten enthalten insofern den Widerspruch, als sie in derselben Rücksicht sich negativ aufeinander beziehende oder sich gegenseitig aufhebende und gegeneinander gleichgültige sind." (ebenda, S. 77)

(*3) ">>Alle Dinge sind an sich selbst widersprechend<<, . . .so wäre der Widerspruch für das Tiefere und Wesenhaftere zu nehmen. . . . er [der Widerspruch] aber ist die Wurzel  aller Bewegung und Lebendigkeit;" (ebenda, S. 74 f.)

(*4) "Es ist dasselbe [Dialektische--Taki] überhaupt das Prinzip aller Bewegung, alles Lebens und aller Betätigung in der Wirklichkeit." (Enzyklopädie, Abschn. 81, Zusatz 1)

(*5) "Das dialektische Moment ist das eigene Sichaufheben solcher endlichen Bestimmungen und ihr Übergehen in ihre entgegengesetzten. " (Enzyklopädie, Abschn. 81)

(*6) "Contradictio est regula veri, non contradictio falsi." (Habilitationsthesen, Suhrkamp Verlag, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 2, S. 533)

(*7) "Syllogismus est principium Idealismi." (ebenda. S. 533)

Comments and suggestions are always welcomed.

e-mail : takin@be.to